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THE FORGOTTEN FISA COURT:  
EXPLORING THE INACTIVITY OF THE ATRC 
© 2019 Aram A. Gavoor1 & Timothy M. Belsan2 
I. INTRODUCTION
After twenty-three years and despite an always-ready cadre of five federal
judges, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”) has not heard a single case.3  
The ATRC is an Article III body4—distinct from the administrative immigration 
1 Visiting Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. 
The authors thank David Byerley for his research support. They also thank the 
participants of the scholars’ workshop hosted by The C. Boyden Gray Center for the 
Study of the Administrative State at the George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law 
School. 
2 National Security Fellow, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies; former law 
clerk to the Hon. (Ret.) Deanell Reece Tacha, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors. 
3 Not only has the ATRC never heard a case, it has also never received or considered an 
ex parte, sealed application from the Department of Justice to initiate proceedings.  FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT, 1996-PRESENT, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-1996-present (last visited 
April 11, 2019) (“As of 2018, the removal court had never received an application from 
the Attorney General for the removal of an alien terrorist, and had therefore conducted no 
proceedings.”). 
4 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58–59 (1982) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1) (Brennan, J. with whom Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, JJ. joined; Rehnquist, J. concurring in the judgment, with whom O’Connor, J., 
joined) (describing the necessary attributes for the exercise of the judicial power of the 
United States).  Though some describe the ATRC as an “Article I court” based on the fact 
that it was created by Congress, e.g., Justin Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A 
Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2178 (2006), “given 
that the court is staffed entirely by Article III judges serving in [an] adjudicative role, it 
appears likely that the Alien Terrorist Removal Court would be considered an Article III 
court,” see ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43746, CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 8, 
n.64 (2014) (citing United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987)).  In a
similar fashion to its creation of the ATRC, Congress “relied on its Article III power to
‘ordain and establish’ the lower federal courts when it created the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(FISCR)[,]” and“[e]ven though these [the FISC and FISCR] courts sit only to hear a
hyper-specialized set of cases, there is no question that they are Article III courts, since
they are staffed by Article III judges and exercise ‘the judicial power of the United
States.’”  STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 647 (6th ed. 2016) (citing
In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (FISA Ct. 2007)
(“Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, the FISC is an inferior federal court
established by Congress under Article III[.]” (footnote omitted))).
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courts—that exists to adjudicate civilly prosecuted alien5 deportation hearings 
within which the government can use classified evidence against alleged terrorists 
without exposing national security information to the defendant or to the public.6  
Established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and with 
a design that was heavily influenced by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
to the degree that it was intended to be populated by the same judges,7 the court’s 
statutory predicate was championed at the request of President Clinton by then-
Senators Joe Biden and Bob Dole.  This article uniquely establishes that the ATRC 
was dead on arrival due to its unworkable—yet legislatively remediable—
procedural flaws.  We will examine the dynamic history of this forgotten court, 
analyze its structure, justify the continuing need for it in light of substantial 
intervening legislation, and lastly propose a commonsense legislative revision that 
would render this important national security law enforcement tool viable. 
In particular, there is still a continuing need for an ATRC to remove certain 
terrorist lawful permanent residents (LPRs).  Though intervening statutes, such as 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)8 and 
the USA PATRIOT Act,9 have provided alternative means to criminally prosecute 
and/or remove noncitizens who otherwise would be theoretical candidates for the 
ATRC, there is no other law enforcement recourse for certain terrorist LPRs than 
this specialized national security court.  In particular, there is no recourse to remove 
LPRs against whom the sole evidence of their terrorist identity is FISA-obtained or 
derived or foreign intelligence information that is not appropriate for 
declassification or public acknowledgment. 
The ATRC statutes, however, are flawed in two dispositive ways.  First, the 
conjunctive findings necessary for the United States to proceed with an ATRC 
removal proceeding where the court does not approve of the government’s 
proposed unclassified summary of key evidence should be styled in a disjunctive 
formulation.  Under the current scheme, the ATRC must find both that,  
(I) the continued presence of the alien in the United States would 
likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or 
death or serious bodily injury to any person, and (II) the provision 
of the summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to 
                                                            
5 The Court recently utilized the term “noncitizen” in the place of “alien” to “refer to any 
person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.”  Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. 
Ct. 2105, 2109-10 n.1 (2018).  This article utilizes the term “alien” only when its use is 
inextricably intertwined with the nuances of the statutory scheme that it examines. 
6 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537. 
7 Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Due Process or “Summary” Justice?: The Alien Terrorist 
Removal Provisions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 143, 146 (1996) (“The removal court is modeled after the 
seven-member secret court set up under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA).”). 
8 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (Sept. 30, 1996). 
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
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the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any 
person.10   
The conjunctive provisions situate the government in the same type of “Catch-22” 
dilemma that justified the ATRC’s creation in the first place—the untenable choice 
between disclosing and risking sources and methods underlying national security 
information versus the removal of alien terrorists.  As evidenced by decades of non-
use, the burden placed on the government by this conjunctive provision is too high 
and renders the ATRC unviable.11  
Second, the language that describes the threat posed by the disclosure of the 
needed classified evidence establishes a problematically unclear level of 
classification.  The ATRC statutes use the phrase “serious and irreparable harm to 
the national security.”12  That standard appears to exist somewhere between the 
standards for classifying evidence as “Secret”—“serious damage” to the national 
security—and “Top Secret”—“exceptionally grave damage” to the national 
security).  In light of these settled standards for classifying evidence that have 
existed for more than forty years,13 Congress should incorporate this normative 
formulation of classification to provide clarity to both the Department of Justice 
and the court regarding what type of classified evidence it contemplates being 
sufficient for proceeding without a summary.14 
Additionally, while making the foregoing critical revisions, Congress 
should make other minor changes related to the use of classified evidence in ATRC 
decision-making to clarify its original intent.15  For example, the ATRC statutes 
should be revised to clarify that classified evidence submitted to the court for in 
camera and ex parte review may be part of the basis for the court’s decision, 
which—despite being the undisputed animating purpose of the ATRC—presently 
is only implied.16 
This proposal is a precise and narrow solution that would render the ATRC 
a viable forum for the nation’s most difficult national security immigration removal 
cases, maintaining an irreducible minimum of due process afforded by providing 
initial and direct Article III judicial involvement and oversight.  These solutions, 
along with the underlying statutes, are designed to be constitutionally compatible, 
but also minimalist to achieve the court’s operability in a non-politicized way.  The 
ATRC was never intended to be a high-volume court used for run-of-the-mill 
removal cases.  It was intended to be a viable option for removing noncitizens who 
posed the greatest threat to the national security without having to compromise 
national security information and sources to do so. 
                                                            
10 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
11 See infra § IV.A. 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).   
13 See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (June 28, 1978) (enumerating the 
types information that can be classified and the classification levels); see also Exec. 
Order. No. 8,381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Mar. 22, 1940) (establishing certain military 
information as “‘secret, ‘confidential,’ or ‘restricted’”). 
14 See infra § IV.B. 
15 See infra § IV.C. 
16 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(5).   
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II. HISTORY & FRAMEWORK OF THE ATRC 
 
A. The Legislative Story of the ATRC 
 
The ATRC was created to address a “recurring problem experienced by the 
Department of Justice”—the inability to use classified information obtained in the 
course of antiterrorism investigations in removal proceedings without putting at 
risk the sources and methods responsible for such information.17  Famously, in the 
late 1980s, the Justice Department sought to deport a group of noncitizens in Los 
Angeles “for their activity on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP).”18  That group came to be known as the “L.A. Eight.”19  In 
January 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrested them for 
immigration violations and attempted to detain them pending removal 
proceedings.20  The INS asserted that it had classified evidence that justified the 
                                                            
17 Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 17 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 22, 2002, at 1, 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/022202LBValentine.pdf.  Indeed, the House Conference 
Report that accompanied the law that ultimately created the ATRC noted, “[t]he removal 
of alien terrorists from the United States, and the prevention of alien terrorists from 
entering the U.S. in the first place, present among the most intractable problems of 
immigration enforcement.”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 115 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  The 
House Conference Report further stated that: 
The stakes in such cases are compelling: protecting the very lives and 
safety of U.S. residents, and preserving the national security. Yet, alien 
terrorists, while deportable under section 241(a)(4)(D) of the INA, are able 
to exploit many of the substantive and procedural provisions available to 
all deportable aliens in order to delay their removal from the U.S. . . . In 
several noteworthy cases, the Department of Justice has consumed years 
of time and hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars seeking to 
secure the removal of such aliens from the U.S. . . . The need for special 
procedures to adjudicate deportation charges against alien terrorists is 
manifest. 
Id. 
18 Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Use It & Lose It”: An Exploration of Unused 
Counterterrorism Laws & Implications for Future Counterterrorism Policies, 16 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 677, 680–81 (2012) (quoting Benjamin Wittes, Secret Deportation 
Panel Raises Due Process Issues; Critics Blast New Court Set up by Anti-Terrorism Law, 
RECORDER (Cal.), Apr. 25, 1996, at 1). 
19 See Jeanne A. Butterfield, Do Immigrants Have First Amendment Rights? Revisiting 
the Los Angeles Eight Case, 212 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 4, 4 (Fall 1999).  The LA Eight 
were actually comprised of seven Palestinians and one Kenyan spouse.  Id.; Neil 
MacFarquhar, U.S., Stymied 21 Years, Drops Bid to Deport 2 Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/us/01settle.html?_r=0. 
20 See Butterfield, supra note 19, at 4.   
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detention, but an administrative immigration judge refused to consider such 
evidence and ordered their release.21 
In 1988, the Ronald Reagan Administration first proposed the creation of a 
court comprised of federal judges that would allow the government to balance the 
competing priorities of removal, where the defendant could defend against the 
charges and the government could protect classified information.22   
Congress did not act on President Reagan’s proposal23 with the Democrat-
controlled Senate “refus[ing] to hold hearings on the proposal.”24  Nor did Congress 
act on the George H.W. Bush Administration’s renewed push for the creation of 
such a specialized court.25  Although the creation of such a court was “one of the 
[Justice Department’s] top counterterrorism legislative priorities in the mid-
1990s”26 and had been pushed by multiple presidential administrations, “Congress 
failed to pass any of the bills providing for these special procedures to remove alien 
terrorists” across three presidential terms, from 1989 through 1994.27 
                                                            
21 See id.  After decades of litigation, including in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, it 
appears that ultimately none of the L.A. Eight were ordered removed and some have 
become U.S. citizens.  MacFarquhar, supra note 19.  In December 2006, Aiad Barakat 
was naturalized in Los Angeles.  See Judge Throws Out Charges in “Los Angeles Eight” 
Case, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS (last updated Oct. 23, 2007), 
https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/judge-throws-out-charges-los-
angeles-eight-case.  Three other members have been granted lawful permanent residency.  
Id.  In October 2007, an immigration judge terminated deportation proceedings against 
two others, Khader Hamide and Michel Shehadeh, both of whom were lawful permanent 
residents when arrested and charged.  Id.  At least one scholar has suggested that “if the 
ATRC statutory framework was available in 1987, the DOJ would have successfully 
deported the L.A. Eight without revealing to them classified information.”  Jonathan H. 
Yu, Combating Terrorism with the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 5 NAT’L SEC. L. 
BRIEF 1, 4 (2015). 
22 Valentine,  supra note 17, at 1-2.  The Reagan Administration’s proposal was labeled 
the “Terrorist Alien Removal Act.”  Blum, supra note 18, at 681; Clarence E. Zachery, 
Jr., The Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures: Removing the Enemy Among Us or 
Becoming the Enemy from Within?, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 291, 292 (1995).  See also 134 
CONG. REC. H3125 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (noting receipt of “[a] letter from the Acting 
Assistant Attorney General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled, 
‘Terrorist Alien Removal Act of 1988’; to the Committee on the Judiciary.”), 1988 WL 
170924; 134 CONG. REC. S7882 (daily ed. June 15, 1988) (noting receipt of “[a] 
communication from the Acting Secretary Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled the Terrorist Alien Removal Act; to 
the Committee on the Judiciary”), 1988 WL 171377. 
23 Valentine, supra note 17, at 2; Yu, supra note 21, at 2-3. 
24 Blum, supra note 18, at 681; see also Zachery, supra note 22, at 292. 
25 Valentine, supra note 17, at 2. 
26 THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S., STAFF REPORT: 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL at 97 (2004). 
27 Zachery, supra note 22, at 292 (citing 139 CONG. REC. 15249-01 (1993) (statement of 
Sen. Smith); 140 CONG. REC. 14534-02 (1994) (statement of Sen. Smith)). 
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In February 1995, then-Senator Joe Biden introduced on behalf of President 
Bill Clinton a bill that, inter alia, sought the creation of the ATRC.28  The bill 
sought to advance many of the terrorism-related provisions that both Presidents 
Reagan and Bush had pushed for without success.  Two months later, on April 19, 
1995, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds of others.29  
The Oklahoma City bombing captured the country’s attention and crystallized the 
resolve of lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to address terrorism.30   
One week after the Oklahoma City bombing, Senate Majority Leader Bob 
Dole introduced the then-labeled “Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 
1995.”31  That bill contained language related to the creation of a removal court for 
alien-terrorists, but with less-comprehensive provisions than the version introduced 
earlier at President Clinton’s behest.32 
                                                            
28 S.390, 104th Cong. (1995); see 141 CONG. REC. S2502-03 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Biden) (noting “I have introduced this bill at the President’s request,” 
but expressing concerns about the ATRC provisions as written); 141 CONG. REC. S2398-
99 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (letter from President Clinton to Congress on the Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act of 1995) (“[One] of the most significant provisions of the bill will . 
. . provide a workable mechanism, utilizing U.S. District Court Judges appointed by the 
Chief Justice, to deport expeditiously alien terrorists without risking the disclosure of 
national security information or techniques.”);  Zachery, supra note 22, at 292. 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL STATEMENT ON THE EXECUTION OF 
TIMOTHY MCVEIGH (May 11, 2001), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2001/May/218ag.htm. 
30 See Carol W. Lewis, The Terror that Failed: Public Opinion In the Aftermath of the 
Bombing in Oklahoma City, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 201 (2000).  It bears noting that the 
February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which killed six and injured more than 
1,000 individuals and which involved foreign nationals committing acts of terrorism on 
U.S. soil, see FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FIRST STRIKE: GLOBAL TERROR IN 
AMERICA (February 26, 2008), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608, also 
played a significant role in the legislative story of the ATRC, see William C. Nagel, Law 
Enforcement Approach to Combating Terrorism: An Analysis of US Policy at 38 (June 
2002) (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438507; Yu, supra note 21, at 3.  It did not, however, 
crystallize sufficient political will to enact anti-terrorism legislation.  Zachery, supra note 
22, at 292. 
31 Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S.735, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 
CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. April 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“America will not 
be intimidated by the madmen who masterminded last week’s vicious and cowardly 
bomb attack in Oklahoma City”). 
32 Senator Biden referred to the Dole-introduced bill as “[t]he Republican substitute bill,” 
noting that it was “built largely around [the] proposals” in the bill he had introduced 
earlier in the year on behalf of President Clinton.  See 141 CONG. REC. S7484 (daily ed. 
May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, 
Preventing A Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 
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The following week, five Democrat Senators (Joe Biden, Thomas Daschle, 
Dianne Feinstein, Christopher Dodd, and Herb Kohl) introduced a revamped 
version of President Clinton’s proposed legislation as Senate Bill 761, adding 
additional provisions seeking “to give Federal law enforcement additional 
resources and tools to use in combating domestic and international terrorism on 
American soil.”33  Notably, S.761 included more robust language related to the 
ATRC, including provisions that were not in the Dole bill regarding the possibility 
that the ATRC might deem inadequate the government’s proposed unclassified 
summary of evidence showing the alien had engaged in terrorist activity, and the 
circumstances in which removal proceedings nonetheless would be permitted to 
press forward without the provision of an adequate summary.34  
Thereafter an agreement was reached, in which more robust provisions 
related to the ATRC—including provisions concerning proceeding without a 
summary—were included in the Dole bill,35 which was eventually renamed the 
“Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996” (AEDPA).  An 
amendment sponsored by Senator Arlen Specter was then adopted, which added 
language requiring dismissal of the action if the ATRC deemed inadequate the 
government’s initial proposed unclassified summary.36   
                                                            
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 248 (1996) (discussing “the President’s very broad bill 
(Clinton bill) and majority leader Dole’s slightly narrower bill (Dole bill)”). 
33 The Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S.761, 104th Cong. (1995); see 141 
CONG. REC. S6202 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (“Coupled with 
the President’s earlier antiterrorism bill directed at international terrorism, this is a sound 
step to respond to a national threat without throwing overboard the civil rights of law-
abiding citizens.”). 
34 Compare The Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S.761, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(Democrat Bill), with Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S.735, 104th 
Cong. (1995) (Republican Bill). 
35 S. Amend. 1199 to S.735, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S7553 (daily ed. May 
25, 1995) (filed on behalf of Senators Dole, Hatch, Nickles, Inhofe, Gramm, and Brown).  
See 104th Cong. S.735 (June 7, 1995) (As Engrossed in the Senate), 
https://www.congress.gov/104/bills/s735/BILLS-104s735es.pdf.  “Although Senate 
Democrats and Senate Republicans introduced competing bills to establish the ATRC’s 
procedures, they agreed on the court’s basic purpose.”  John Dorsett Niles, Note, 
Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 57 DUKE L.J. 1833, 
1864 (2008) (quoting Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. 
L.J. 693, 708 (1998)); see also Kopel & Olson, supra note 32, at 248 (“[A] deal was 
arranged by which various provisions from the Clinton bill would be added to the Dole 
bill, in exchange for White House support for the Dole bill’s provisions to sharply curtail 
habeas corpus.”).  Cf. 147 CONG. REC. S11581-82 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy) (“The Alien Terrorist Removal Court was created . . . largely through the 
efforts of Senators Hatch and Dole.”), 2001 WL 1386283. 
36 Other amendments would have included language that required the dismissal of any 
action where an unclassified summary was deemed inadequate.  See, e.g., S. Amend. 
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Almost a year to the day after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate 
began debating AEDPA.37  Congress passed AEDPA with broad, bipartisan 
support,38 and on April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed AEDPA into law, 
formally creating what would become known as the ATRC.39  In his signing 
statement, President Clinton lauded the creation of the ATRC as one of “the tough 
new tools to stop terrorists before they strike.”40  
The ATRC statutes were revised later in 1996 as part of IIRIRA, and, among 
other changes, Congress restored the possibility that removal proceedings might 
proceed even if the ATRC deemed the proposed unclassified summary inadequate, 
so long as certain criteria related to national security are met.41   
 
B. Processes & Standards for Using Classified Evidence  
 
Congress established a detailed process for ATRC removal proceedings.42  
Removal proceedings under the ATRC may only be pursued when the U.S. 
Department of Justice files a statutorily-obligated application, including a 
certification by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, establishing, 
among other things, probable cause to believe that the proposed defendant is an 
alien terrorist for whom traditional removal proceedings would pose a risk to the 
national security of the United States.43  Proceedings are not initiated unless an 
                                                            
1250 to S. Amend 1199 to S.735, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposed by Senators Specter, 
Biden, Kennedy, and Simon). 
37 See 142 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Senator Hatch) 
(“This is a particularly relevant time to being this debate because we are fast approaching 
the 1-year anniversary of the heinous crime that claimed the lives of so many men, 
women, and children in Oklahoma City, OK.  Indeed, this Friday, the 19th, marks the 1-
year anniversary of that tragedy.”). 
38 AEDPA passed on a vote of 91-8 in the Senate and 293-133 in the House of 
Representatives.  S. 735 (104th): Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/s735/details (last visited May 
19, 2019). 
39 The court is not referred to as the ATRC in the original legislation, but formally 
adopted the name in its rules.  Alien Terrorist Removal Court Rule 1, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
37. 
40 William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism & Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (Apr. 24, 1996), 1996 WL 203049, at *1, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-
pg630.pdf. 
41 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 
3009 (Sept. 30, 1996).  The September 1996 amendment also added the provisions in 8 
U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(E) and (F) related to continuing the hearing without a summary and 
appointed of a “special” cleared counsel for LPR defendants, and the provisions in  
labeled “continuation of hearing without summary” § 1535(c) related to appeals in cases 
where no summary was provided.  See id. 
42 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-36. 
43 Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
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ATRC judge agrees that the application establishes probable cause on both points.44  
These preliminary steps are done ex parte, in camera, and under seal,45 and none 
of the evidence submitted can be considered by the ATRC in determining whether 
to issue a removal order unless it is resubmitted in the government’s case in chief.46 
In order to use classified evidence in the removal proceeding itself, the 
government also must submit for the court’s review a proposed unclassified 
summary that could be given to the alien defendant.47  The court, in possession of 
both the classified evidence and the proposed unclassified summary, must 
determine whether the summary is “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a 
defense.”48  If the court finds the summary adequate, the case proceeds with the 
classified evidence included as part of the government’s case in chief, but without 
such information being disclosed to the alien defendant other than in the 
unclassified summary.49 
If the court finds the proposed summary inadequate, however, “the removal 
hearing shall be terminated” unless the judge finds both that “the continued 
presence of the alien in the United States would likely cause serious and irreparable 
harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person,” and 
“the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to 
the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.”50 Where the 
judge finds that both criteria are met, the removal hearing proceeds, the alien is 
advised that “no summary is possible,” and the classified information is entered as 
evidence for the court’s consideration.51 
The removal hearing itself is open to the public and must occur “as 
expeditiously as practicable.”52  The alien defendant has rights to be represented by 
counsel at government expense,53 and to present evidence,54 subpoena witnesses,55 
and cross-examine the government’s witnesses (except on issues related to 
                                                            
44 Id. § 1533(c)(2).  The government may supplement its application with “information, 
including classified information, presented under oath or affirmation” and testimony at a 
hearing on the application.  Id. § 1533(c)(1). 
45 Id. § 1533(a)(2). 
46 Id. § 1534(c)(5). 
47 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(A), (B). 
48 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C). 
49 Id. § 1534(f), (i), (j).  If the alien defendant holds permanent resident status, the ATRC 
will appoint cleared counsel who can “review[] in camera the classified evidence on 
behalf of the alien” and “challeng[e] through an in camera proceeding the veracity of the 
evidence contained in the classified information.”  Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F).  Cleared counsel 
may not, however, “disclose the [classified] information to the alien or to any other 
attorney representing the alien.”  Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii).   
50 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii), (iii).  The government is also provided one opportunity to 
revise the unclassified summary in an attempt to “correct the deficiencies identified by 
the court.”  Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii). 
51 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E). 
52 Id. § 1534(a). 
53 Id. § 1534(c)(1). 
54 Id. § 1534(c)(2). 
55 Id. § 1534(d). 
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classified information).56  The alien may not, however, seek to suppress evidence 
on the basis that it was unlawfully obtained.57   
Following the hearing, the ATRC must issue a written ruling,58 which either 
party may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.59  Notably, if an alien was not provided with an unclassified summary of 
the classified evidence submitted by the government, appeal is automatic60 and 
findings of fact are reviewed de novo.61  All appeals are to be handled on an 
expedited basis, with the court of appeals required to issue a decision within sixty 
days of the ATRC’s decision.62 
Notwithstanding this detailed process, the ATRC has not been used in any 
way since its creation in 1996.63  Although the court has remained continuously 
constituted by five federal judges, who are selected by the Chief Justice of the 
United States,64 the Department of Justice has yet to submit an application for the 
initiation of proceedings.65 
 
III. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE ATRC 
In light of the ATRC’s complete non-use since its genesis and the 
subsequent enactment of legislation implicating its potential pool of cases, the 
threshold question of whether such a court is needed must be addressed.66  Indeed, 
                                                            
56 Id. § 1534(c)(3), (d)(1), (d)(5), and (e)(2). 
57 Id. § 1534(e)(1)(B). 
58 Id. § 1534(j).  The court must redact any portion of its written decision “that would 
reveal the substance or source” of classified information that was submitted in camera 
and ex parte.  Id. 
59 Id. § 1535(c). 
60 Id. § 1535(c)(2). 
61 Id. § 1535(c)(4)(D). 
62 Id. § 1535(c)(4). 
63 See supra note 3. 
64 8 U.S.C. § 1532.  The current members of the court are federal district court judges 
Anne Conway (M.D. Fla.), James Parker Jones (W.D. Va.), Michael Mosman (D. Or.), 
Thomas Russell (W.D. Ky.), and Rosemary Collyer (D.D.C.), who serves as the court’s 
chief judge.  See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Alien Terrorist Removal Court: Judges, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-judges (last visited April 
10, 2019).  All five judges currently serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.  
Compare id., with FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court: Judges, 
https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FISC%20FISCR%20Judges%20May%2
02018.pdf (last visited April 10, 2019).  Congress expressly suggested that this overlap 
might be a smart decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (“The Chief Justice may, in the Chief 
Justice’s discretion, designate the same judges under this section as are designated 
pursuant to section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
U.S.C. 1803(a)).”). 
65 See supra note 3. 
66 Notably, the ATRC is not the only zombie federal court to have existed.  For example, 
in 1971, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (based on the 
prior Emergency Court of Appeals), which had “exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from the decisions of the U.S. district courts in cases arising under the wage and price 
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subsequent legislative changes to other sections of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”) have materially changed the landscape upon which the ATRC was 
originally designed.  Even taking these factors into account, however, we believe 
there is still a need for the ATRC as a venue for the most difficult removal cases. 
The ATRC was intended to be a low-volume court.67  Congress created 
numerous threshold barriers for potential cases before they would reach the ATRC.  
For example, an application seeking to initiate ATRC proceedings must certify that 
“removal under [conventional administrative removal proceedings before an 
immigration judge] would pose a risk to the national security of the United 
States.”68  Thus, cases should strictly go through conventional removal proceedings 
if possible without risking the exposure of national security information.69  
Congress specified that the ATRC is only to be used where the Attorney General 
determines that resorting to conventional removal proceedings would jeopardize 
national security.70  Moreover, given the Justice Department’s law enforcement 
mission71 and the significant burden the ATRC statutes place on the most senior 
Department leadership before initiation of an action,72 there is strong incentive for 
the government to pursue criminal charges whenever possible.73 
                                                            
control program of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.”  FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 1971-1992, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/temporary-emergency-court-appeals-1971-1992 (last visited 
July 21, 2019) .  That court was abolished in 1992.  Id.  And in 1973, Congress created 
the Special Railroad Court, “which facilitated the consolidation and management of 
several railroads undergoing bankruptcy reorganization.”  FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Special 
Railroad Court, 1974-1997, https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/special-railroad-court-1974-
1997 (last visited July 21, 2019).  The Special Railroad Court was abolished in 1997.  Id.  
The authors are unware, however, of any other Article III court that, like the ATRC, has 
never heard a case and has not been abolished.  It bears noting, however, that the FISA 
Review Court heard its first case more than 20 years after its creation.  See In re Sealed 
Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting that this case was the first appeal 
to the Court of Review since the passage of FISA in 1978).  Theoretically, it is possible 
that the ATRC is simply a once-every-twenty-five-years court and its time for use has not 
yet come. 
67 See, e.g., Andrew Becker, Terrorist Court Unused 16 Years After Creation, CAL. 
WATCH: PUBLIC SAFETY–DAILY REPORT (Apr. 12, 2012), https://archive.ph/v0ga3 
(archived version) (citing DOJ officials as indicating “the court was intended to be low 
volume, as most suspected foreign terrorists can be removed without the use of classified 
evidence”). 
68 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(iii). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OUR MISSION STATEMENT, https://www.justice.gov/about (last 
visited July 21, 2019). 
72 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(iii) (requiring “certification by the Attorney General or the 
Deputy Attorney General”). 
73 Notably, however, conviction and removal are not mutually exclusive; an alien 
convicted of a terrorism offense who serves out his or her criminal sentence is likely 
removable, see Id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(iii) (aggravated felony), (a)(3) (terrorist activity), and 
1101(f) (43) (listing aggravated felonies), and presumably, removal proceedings will be 
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Significant legislative reforms have undeniably narrowed the scope of 
potential cases necessitating utilization of the ATRC.  In September 1996, five 
months after creating the ATRC, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).74  IIRIRA modified the process for 
removal proceedings to require that a respondent placed in conventional 
administrative removal proceedings has the initial burden to lawful admission by 
an immigration officer, or if he cannot prove prior admission to the United States, 
to prove that he is admissible to the United States.75  Only if the individual proves 
lawful admission does the burden shift to the government to prove removability 
from the United States.76  Notably, the government may introduce and rely on 
classified information that the immigration court reviews ex parte and in camera in 
circumstances where the noncitizen argues that he is admissible at the time of 
commencement of the conventional removal proceedings rather than some previous 
admission.77  Thus, IIRIRA erected a key threshold barrier for potential ATRC 
cases by making it easier to use conventional removal proceedings in situations 
where the respondent was never inspected.78  Importantly, however, the IIRIRA 
amendments did not provide the ability to rely ex parte on classified evidence to 
establish removability of a subclass of noncitizens, lawful permanent residents 
(LPR).  
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of “engage in 
terrorist activity” under the INA.79  The PATRIOT Act amendments further 
impacted the pool of potential ATRC cases by modifying the lack-of-knowledge 
defense to ensure that individuals who provided material support to a terrorist 
organization, regardless of their claimed subjective belief concerning the intended 
purpose for such support, could be found to have engaged in terrorist activity and 
be removable.80 Thus, a wider range of conduct, some of which might be provable 
without needing to rely on classified evidence, would support conventional removal 
proceedings on terrorism-related grounds. 
                                                            
initiated against such individuals in most if not all cases, see, e.g., Meskini v. Att’y Gen., 
No. 4:14-cv-42, 2018 WL 1321576 (M.D. Ga. March 14, 2018) (discussing post-
incarceration efforts to remove individual convicted of terrorism-related offenses). 
74 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Public L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3546 (Sept. 30, 1996). 
75 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2). 
76 Id. § 1229a(c)(3). 
77 Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (“. . . these rights shall not entitle the alien to examine such 
national security information as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien’s 
admission to the United States or to an application by the alien for discretionary relief 
under this chapter”).  Notably, the government may rely on classified evidence in all 
conventional removal proceedings to oppose an alien’s request for forms of discretionary 
relief from removal.  Id. 
78 See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98 (“A major reason for the lack of use of the 
ATRC was that new immigration laws permitted the use of classified evidence in 
traditional deportation hearings, making recourse to a special court unnecessary.”). 
79 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) 
(2002). 
80 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).   
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The IIRIRA and PATRIOT Act provided additional law enforcement tools 
that reduced the pool of potential cases in which the ATRC might be needed.81  
Notwithstanding, we believe there is continuing need for the ATRC in relation to a 
specific type of case: LPRs for whom the only viable removal charge is based on 
terrorism activity that can only be proven by reliance on national security 
information that cannot be declassified.82  Indeed, removal of terrorist LPRs was 
likely the “main impetus of the ATRC.”83  
Importantly, LPR defendants—which, at this point, are likely to be the only 
defendants due to the availability of other criminal and civil enforcement tools—
are entitled to additional procedural protections that are not available to other 
noncitizens if there is no unclassified summary provided.84  These include court-
appointed, government-funded cleared counsel who is entitled to review the 
underlying classified information and challenge it on the merits.85  This is similar 
to the procedural rights afforded by the Classified Information Procedures Act 
(CIPA) context,86 and like the classified information accessed under a CIPA 
protective order, such attorney is prohibited from disclosing any of the classified 
information to the defendant.87 
Moreover, LPR terrorists present a real threat according to data on terrorist 
attacks by foreign-born individuals.88 A 2019 Cato Institute report found that 
foreign-born terrorists were responsible for at least 86 percent (or 3,037) of the 
3,518 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end of 
                                                            
81 See, e.g., ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98.  We note that it is it is theoretically 
possible that the PATRIOT Act’s expanded definition language might qualify more cases 
for ATRC consideration. 
82 See, e.g., Sarah Lorr, Note, Reconciling Classified Evidence and A Petitioner’s Right to 
A “Meaningful Review" at Guantánamo Bay: A Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2669, 2708 (2009) (noting that, theoretically, “the ATRC could be used to remove 
residents currently within the country and also permanent residents entering at a border 
where the government has secret evidence against them”). 
83 Blum, supra note 18, at 685 (“the main impetus of the ATRC appears to be deporting 
LPRs who are engaging in terrorist activity . . .); id. at 691 (“Congress presumably 
created the ATRC to deal with LPRs charged under terrorist grounds of deportability.”). 
84 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1534. 
85 Id.  One scholar has argued that this provision renders the classified evidence “non-
secret.”  See Niles, supra note 35, at 1860 (arguing that where cleared counsel is provided 
and allowed to review the classified evidence, e.g. where the case involves an LPR, “the 
evidence is not secret . . .[a]lthough the resident alien does not view the secret evidence 
personally, for the purposes of cross-examining the evidence the alien may fairly be said 
to view it constructively through the eyes of the special attorney.”). 
86 Lorr, supra note 82, at 2710 (“As in CIPA, the attorney cannot disclose the classified 
information to the alien.”). 
87 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii) (ATRC non-disclosure provision); 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 3 
(CIPA non-disclosure provision). 
88 See Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status & Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 
1975–2017, 866 POLICY ANALYSIS (Cato Institute, Wash., D.C.), May 7, 2019, at 1-2, 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorists-immigration-status-
nationality-risk-analysis-1975-2017.  
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2017.89  The report also found that there were “192 foreign-born terrorists who 
planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil from 1975 through 
2017.”90  The most common category of immigration status for the foreign-born 
terrorists was LPR; indeed “[m]ore terrorists have taken advantage of the LPR 
category than of any other visa category.”91  Thus, contrary to what might be 
expected, “[m]ost foreign-born terrorists often live [in the United States] peacefully 
for years before concocting their schemes,”92 and it is important to have a tool to 
remove such individuals where the government discovers—and classified evidence 
shows—that they are engaging in terrorist activity, including planning an attack. 
The ATRC is also necessary to utilize specific types of evidence without 
compromising the underlying sources.  Most notably, the ATRC statutes waive the 
requirement of notice to a defendant where the government intends to use evidence 
that is “obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance” under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).93  This varies from the general rule requiring 
such notice, which otherwise applies in every “trial, hearing, or other proceeding in 
or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority 
of the United States.”94  Similarly, using the ATRC may be necessary for cases 
involving evidence that was collected by a foreign government, particularly by 
human intelligence sources, and shared with the United States.95  Thus, using such 
evidence in a criminal case or as part of the case-in-chief in conventional removal 
proceedings for an LPR would require disclosing its existence, which “can pose an 
obstacle to future cooperation between the United States and the foreign 
government.”96  Often, evidence obtained via the intelligence of a foreign 
government is provided to the United States with the caveat that such evidence and 
                                                            
89 See id. An additional “68 were murdered by unidentified terrorists.”  Id.  
90 Id. at 3 (notably, the report “counts terrorists who were discovered trying to enter the 
United States on a forged passport or visa as illegal immigrants”).  By contrast, there 
were “788 native-born terrorists who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. 
soil from 1975 through 2017.”  Id.  That said, there is no method for removing a natural-
born terrorist. 
91 Id. at 2, 6, 21. The Cato Report notes, however, that the odds of an individual being 
killed on U.S. soil by a foreign-born terrorist are highest for individuals present in the 
United States on a tourist visa, because 18 of 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were in that status.  
Id. at 6.  Moreover, “[t]errorist with green cards came from 30 different countries.”  Id. at 
21. 
92 Id. at 2. 
93 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1); see also Harkenrider, supra note 7, at 150 (“the suspected alien 
terrorist is not entitled to any information gathered under FISA”).  Indeed, the defendant 
is even prohibited from learning of the source for such information via other discovery.  8 
U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(C).   
94 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c). 
95 Yu, supra note 21, at 14 (noting that “government or foreign personnel—that are 
clearly not law enforcement—largely gather the evidence in terrorism cases”). 
96 Trying Terrorists in Article III Courts Challenges & Lessons Learned, AM. BAR ASS’N 
STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SEC. at 16 (July 2009), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/natsecurity/trying_terrorists_artI
II_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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cooperation remains secret.97  And where the evidence comes from a witness who 
is a foreign intelligence agent or human source, the foreign government may simply 
refuse to allow the witness to testify.98  Foreign governments do not always follow 
the same protocols as United States law enforcement when collecting evidence.99  
Importantly, regardless of how the United States obtained the evidence, the ATRC 
will not entertain motions by the defendant to suppress the evidence.100   
Finally, maintaining the ATRC is generally a cost neutral proposition.101  
The five judges who serve on the ATRC do so as a collateral responsibility and do 
not receive additional compensation.102  The ATRC has no budget or staff, and 
“exists without a website or even a physical meeting place.”103  The court’s 
procedures were enacted decades ago and remain in place, waiting for the moment 
when the court is called into action.104  To the extent there is any cost, it is 
substantially outweighed by the “human costs of LPR terrorism” which one 
estimate totals as $255 million over a 43 year period ending in 2017.105 
 
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
A commonly advanced hypothesis to explain the ATRC’s non-utilization is 
the lack of certainty regarding the constitutionality of the court’s adjudicatory 
procedures under the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee.106  While debate 
                                                            
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 15. 
100 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(B).  This elimination of the evidentiary exclusionary rule also 
covers challenges to chain of custody where essential links in the chain are classified.  
Yu, supra note 21, at 16.  Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay 
rules, do not apply.  8 U.S.C. § 1534(h).   
101 Robert Sorrell, Federal Judge in Abingdon One of 12 to Serve on Never-used Court to 
Remove Terrorists, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (March 17, 2019) (citing a spokesperson 
for the Administration Office of the U.S. Courts).  But see Emily C. Kendall, The Alien 
Terrorist Removal Court & Other National Security Measures You May Have Never 
Heard of: The Need for Comprehensive National Security Reform, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 253, 269–70 (2011) (arguing, without support, that “disbanding the ATRC . . . will 
also save money” because it is an “institution that wastes money, manpower, and 
resources that could be put to much better use in other facets of homeland security”). 
102 Sorrell, supra note 101 (citing a spokesperson for the Administration Office of the 
U.S. Courts); Becker, supra note 67. 
103 Opinion: Our View: Special Court Has Never Seen a Case. It Never Should, BRISTOL 
HERALD COURIER (March 30, 2019).  
104 Alien Terrorist Removal Court Rules, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37. 
105 See Nowrasteh, supra note 88, at 22.  
106 See, e.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 856 (4th ed. 2007) (“It 
may be that constitutional doubts about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this 
special court are why the government has never used it.”); Blum, supra note 18, at 703 
(“Many scholars have argued that the ATRC deprives aliens of procedural due process 
under the Fifth Amendment; hence, its non-use may reflect a fear that if it was used to 
remove aliens based on classified evidence, it may be struck down as unconstitutional.”); 
id. at 704-10 (reviewing arguments made against constitutionality of ATRC); Niles, 
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on that topic is to be expected because the statutory scheme has never been 
judicially tested, we view such explanation as incomplete because it does not 
meaningfully consider or examine the type of nuance that we explore in this 
article.107  The United States has proven itself willing to test the due process muster 
of its various national security or immigration enforcement tools.108  Presumably, a 
number of circumstances have arisen since the AEDPA’s passage that would justify 
risking constitutional challenges to the statute or to the court by using it.  Indeed, 
the 9/11 Commission staff report indicates that at least 100 cases had been referred 
to and reviewed by the Justice Department for possible ATRC proceedings.109 The 
report acknowledges that many of the potential cases were “overwhelmed” by “the 
procedural complexities,” or “stalled by internal Justice Department deliberations” 
related to, among other things, the risk to the underlying classified information, 
which FBI refused to make available for prosecution purposes.110   
Accordingly, we conclude that the non-use of the ATRC is due to 
procedural hurdles erected by the original legislation.111  In particular, the dual 
findings required for the ATRC to authorize the use of classified evidence without 
an unclassified summary of such evidence impose an unworkably high burden on 
the government, preventing use of the ATRC for exactly the type of cases that it 
                                                            
supra note 35, at 1837 (“Perhaps out of fear about the ATRC’s constitutionality, the 
attorney general has never used the court.”).   
107 See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98 (noting numerous reasons why cases were 
not pursued, including “procedural complexities that soon overwhelmed these terrorist 
cases”). 
108 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (concluding that the 
government’s detention of a U.S. citizen and unlawful enemy combatant violated the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517-18 (2003) 
(detention of criminal alien did not violate Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause). Cf. 
Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html 
(discussing killing of United States citizen in Yemen by drone strike). 
109 See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 97-98 (“by 1998, Justice attorneys in the 
Terrorism and Violent Crime Section had led a department review of 50 cases for 
possible application to the ATRC, but they were all rejected.  Over the following two 
years, another 50 cases were rejected.”).   
110 See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98.  The 9/11 Commission Staff’s report was 
based, among other things, on interviews in 2003 with former INS Commissioner Doris 
Meissner and Dan Cadman and Laura Baxter, who worked for INS’s National Security 
Unit, which was then responsible for case referrals to the ATRC.  Id. at 96, 98.  Notably, 
some potential ATRC cases also stalled because of internal deliberations regarding “alien 
rights and sufficiency of evidence.”  Id. at 98. 
111 Cf. David A. Martin, Prevention Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for the Enemy 
Combatant Debate, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 305, 328 (2004) (Transcription of David 
Martin’s testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, December 8, 2003) (“To date the ATRC has not been used, probably owing to the 
very narrow range of circumstances that come within its jurisdiction—a statutory 
restriction that is not well understood.”); Valentine, supra note 17, at 1-2 (“the statutory 
restraints on the [ATRC] make it effectively useless”).  
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was intended to hear.112  Additionally, the unique and imprecise standard that 
describes the threat posed by publicly disclosing necessary classified evidence 
severely diminishes the utility of the ATRC statutes as a prosecutorial tool.113  
These barriers should be acknowledged and legislatively corrected to render the 
ATRC a viable forum for appropriate cases, as originally intended.114 
 
A. The dual findings necessary to utilize classified information where 
no adequate summary is possible should be alternative options. 
 
The ATRC was created so that the federal government could introduce 
classified evidence in support of its effort to remove noncitizens engaged in terrorist 
activity while preserving the classified nature of that evidence and its sources.115  
As discussed above, the government can only introduce classified evidence in the 
ATRC removal proceeding in two circumstances.116  First, classified evidence can 
be admitted where the ATRC deems the government’s proposed unclassified 
                                                            
112 147 CONG. REC. S11577 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“I have 
been informed that the notice requirements and other procedural obstacles that force the 
Federal Government to disclose classified information just basically renders the ATRC 
useless.”), 2001 WL 1386283; 147 CONG. REC. S11579 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) 
(statement of Sen. Smith) (noting that, based on discussions with the U.S. Attorney 
General, “the Justice Department has used the court, as I said before, not once—not even 
one time—to deport any alien terrorist or suspected alien terrorist.  Again, the reason is 
because they have to compromise their sources and methods to do it. . . . The intelligence 
community gets this, and they cannot act on it because to act on it would compromise 
their own people and their methods of collection. To not act on it means they stay here.  
So that is where we are.  That is why not one case has been brought to court since my 
legislation created it in 1996.”).  But see 147 CONG. REC. S11582 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 
2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (indicating that, based on his discussion with the 
Department of Justice, the ATRC’s non-use “is not because an unclassified summary has 
to be provided to the defendant” and he did not understand the Justice Department to be 
seeking a blanket exception to providing an unclassified summary), 2001 WL 1386283. 
113 See Edward T. Pound & Chitra Ragavan, Finger-Pointing, Fingerprints: The Hunt for 
Evidence and, Hard On Its Heels, Charges About Who Screwed Up, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 1, 
2001), reprinted in Congressional Record at 147 CONG. REC. S11580 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 
2001) (“Former Justice Department officials say the agency couldn’t use the [ATRC] 
because the law requires disclosure of sensitive information to terrorists—evidence, they 
say, that would compromise intelligence gathering and identify sources.”), 2001 WL 
1386283. 
114 As a threshold point and notwithstanding questions of judicial deference doctrine 
applicability or the congressional Article III court creation authority, the Justice 
Department lacks the authority to regulate to remedy some of these and other issues 
because the ATRC statutes—as they relate to judicial administration and standards—are 
not organic to the Department.  See, e.g., Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FTC, 482 
F.2d 672, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
115 Beall, supra note 35, at 708. 
116 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3).  This is specific to the removal hearing itself, as opposed to the 
application for the initiation of such a proceeding.  See id. § 1533(c). 
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summary to be “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense.”117  Second, 
even where the court finds the proposed summary inadequate, it can nonetheless 
admit the classified information into evidence if it makes certain findings.118  It is 
those findings that pose one of the biggest barriers to the use of the ATRC. 
By statute, the ATRC can only admit classified information into evidence 
without the provision of an unclassified summary if it determines that “(I) the 
continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any 
person, and (II) the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any 
person.”119  Because the statute uses the conjunctive “and,” the ATRC must find 
that both (I) and (II) are satisfied. 
It would be imprudent for the government to begin the ATRC process in 
precedent-setting circumstances when it is not reasonably confident that it will be 
able to rely on the very classified evidence that warrants the use of such venue from 
the start.120  It would be rare that the government can rest assured that its proposed 
summary will be deemed adequate.121  If such a summary were sufficiently specific, 
                                                            
117 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C). 
118 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii). 
119 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii), (iii).  The government is also provided one opportunity to 
revise the unclassified summary in an attempt to “correct the deficiencies identified by 
the court.”  Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii). 
120 Although many aspects of the ATRC process are similar to the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (CIPA), see Blum, supra note 18, at 739 n.9, the two are analytical 
distinct and used for very different purposes.  CIPA, which applies only to criminal cases, 
see CIPA, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, 2025 (1980) (“An Act to provide certain 
pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving classified 
information.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Sum of $70,990,605, No. 12-cv-1905, 
2015 WL 1021118, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2015)  (“CIPA is reserved for criminal cases”), 
is intended to allow the government to know what classified information must be 
produced in discovery and may come in at trial, id. (“CIPA provides criminal procedures 
that permit a trial judge to rule on the relevance or admissibility of classified information 
in a secure setting”); 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 4, 6, 8.  Unlike the ATRC, CIPA does not 
allow the introduction of evidence in the case in chief to which the Defendant does not 
personally have access.  Id. § 6; Lorr, supra note 82, at 2712 (“immigration is the only 
area of the law where absolutely secret evidence is permitted as evidence in an 
adversarial setting”); id. at 2700 (“CIPA does not allow a jury to see any information that 
the defendant himself cannot see.”).   
In 2001, Rep. David Bonior unsuccessfully proposed legislation that would have 
made CIPA applicable to immigration proceedings, including proceedings in the ATRC.  
See Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2001, H.R. 1266, 107th Cong. (2001). 
121 Niles, supra note 35, at 1857.  As Niles notes, the “adequate summary” requirement is 
“unrealistic” in most cases that would end up at the ATRC.  Id.  Indeed, a case has only 
made it to that stage after the Attorney General found, and an Article III judge agreed, 
there is probable cause to believe the defendant is an “alien terrorist” and that 
conventional removal proceedings would pose a risk to the national security.  Id.; 8 
U.S.C. § 1533; see also Beall, supra note 35, at 707 (arguing “[i]t is also unclear how 
detailed the summary must be” as it appears to be left entirely to judicial discretion). 
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it would risk revealing to the alien or others the government’s classified 
information, sources, and potentially methods of collection.122  This results in a 
Catch-22, which one former high-level Department of Justice official has 
described: 
If the government prepares an unclassified summary of the evidence 
that is too vague and general, it will not be approved by the Judge.  
If, on the other hand, the evidence is too clear and specific, the 
classified evidence itself will be effectively disclosed, thus harming 
national security by compromising sources and methods of 
intelligence gathering.123 
Given this Catch-22 and the very real likelihood that it will be unable to 
share enough information for the ATRC to deem the summary adequate, before 
initiating a case, the Department of Justice must determine whether it can satisfy 
the standard for proceeding without an adequate unclassified summary.124  Meeting 
both prongs of that standard, however, imposes an untenable burden on the 
government.125  The government must show not only that the information is 
properly classified at a very high level (finding II),126 but also that allowing the 
alien to remain in the United States would cause “serious and irreparable harm” to 
the national security or grave physical harm to another person (finding I). 
                                                            
122 See Niles, supra note 35, at 1857; see also 147 CONG. REC. S11577 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 
2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) (attributing non-use of the ATRC to the statute’s notice 
provision “that render the court ineffective and useless”: “[The Federal Government and 
intelligence community] are damned if they do and damned if they don’t because if they 
provide the information, they compromise their own sources and methods. If they don’t 
provide it, we can’t deport them.”), 2001 WL 1386283. 
123 Valentine, supra note 17, at 1-2.  From 1988 to 1993, Valentine served in the Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush Administrations as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation.  See id. 
124 Kendall, supra note 101, at 269 (noting that the ATRC was designed to allow the 
government to avoid having “to choose between allowing the alien’s continued stay in 
the U.S., which threatens national security, or to disclose its reasons for initiating the 
alien’s deportation, a disclosure which in itself could endanger the country.”). 
125 See Proposed Amendment 2114 to Senate Bill 1428, 147 CONG. REC. S11630-31 
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (proposing amendment to the ATRC statutes to allow for use of 
classified information without any requirement for an unclassified summary, concluding 
“[t]he [ATRC] has never been used because the United States is required to submit for 
judicial approval an unclassified summary of the classified evidence against the alien.  If 
too general, this summary will be disapproved by the Judge.  If too specific, this 
summary will compromise the underlying classified information.”); 147 CONG. REC. 
S11577 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement by Sen. Smith) (“The reason for [the ATRC’s 
non-use] is we are required under the law to submit to the terrorists a summary of the 
intelligence we gathered on him and how we got it.  Obviously, if the terrorist gets that 
information, then the people who provided that information are going to be killed or their 
lives will be at risk.”), 2001 WL 1386283; 147 CONG. REC. S11631 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 
2001), 2001 WL 1386320. 
126 See infra Section IV.B discussing the lack of clarity regarding the level of 
classification required. 
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Consider two illustrative hypothetical fact patterns of possible ATRC 
candidate cases that would ultimately fail due to the conjunctive finding 
requirement: 
 
Hypothetical Case 1 
 
Suppose the government had FISA-obtained information classified at the 
Top Secret level—utilized only where disclosure of the information would result in 
exceptionally grave damage to the national security—indicating that the alien 
defendant was raising funds for a new terrorist organization that has stated its 
intention to attack U.S. citizens abroad, and has what appears to be a viable plan 
for doing so, but whose immediate capabilities are non-existent or seriously in 
question.127  Such information would likely satisfy required finding II because of 
the damage that would likely be caused by revealing the classified information or 
source, but it might not establish that the alien’s continued presence in the United 
States “would likely” result in serious and irreparable damage to the United States 
or an individual (required finding I). 
 
Hypothetical Case 2 
 
Conversely, suppose the government had information obtained other than 
from a human source and classified at the Secret level—utilized where disclosure 
of the information would result in serious damage to the national security—
indicating that the alien defendant was intending to physically attack a senior 
official at a foreign country’s mission to the United Nations in New York City.128  
Such information would likely satisfy required finding I because of the danger to 
the individual, but arguably not required finding II because the classification level 
of the evidence would indicate that disclosure of such information is not expected 
to rise to the level of “serious and irreparable” damage. 
 
Both hypotheticals assume that the dispositive evidence cannot not be 
declassified and that traditional administrative removal proceedings are not viable, 
and thus, present as the type of cases that the ATRC was created to handle.  It seems 
inappropriate to force the government to make a Hobson’s choice between (a) 
allowing such individuals to remain in the United States and dedicating substantial 
law enforcement resources to monitor their activity or (b) disclosing the classified 
information (and perhaps burning the underlying methods or sources) in order to 
seek the terrorist-alien’s removal.129 
                                                            
127 This would likely constitute “terrorist activity” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV). 
128 This would likely constitute “terrorist activity” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(III) 
given the employee’s status as an “internationally protected person.”  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1116(b)(4). 
129 Cf. 141 CONG. REC. S7480 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Senator Orrin 
Hatch) (“[The] success of our counter-terrorism efforts depends on the effective use of 
classified information used to infiltrate foreign terrorist groups.  We cannot afford to turn 
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 To render the ATRC workable, Congress should revise 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1354(e)(3)(D)(iii) so that either finding would allow the removal hearing to move 
forward without a summary.  Replacing the conjunctive “and” with the disjunctive 
“or” would increase the likelihood that the Department of Justice will utilize the 
ATRC for the most serious removal cases.  Such change would make the above 
hypothetical cases viable cases for ATRC consideration as a statutory and practical 
administration matter. 
Moreover, changing the statute to the disjunctive comports with the version 
of the bills originally introduced by President Clinton and several senior Democrat 
Senators.130  Both of those bills provided that the removal hearing could proceed 
without a summary if the ATRC found: 
(A) the continued presence of the alien in the United States, or 
(B) the provision of the required summary would likely cause 
serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or 
serious bodily injury to any person.131 
Thus, the original proposals by the Democrat Senators required the ATRC to make 
either Finding I or Finding II, not both. 
The legislative history is unclear how the findings ended up being written 
in the conjunctive, which appears to have occurred when Republican leadership 
incorporated a more robust version of the ATRC provisions into the bill originally 
proposed by Senator Dole one week after the Oklahoma City bombing.   
Regardless of whether the findings were required in the conjunctive by way 
of a drafting error or intentionally, revising them to be disjunctive alternatives 
would be a serious step toward addressing “the Catch-22 situation that has crippled 
the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.”132 
 
B. The classification level for evidence deemed sufficient to proceed 
without a summary is unclear and should be revised. 
 
As shown above, in most if not all cases, the ATRC will be required to 
determine whether the government has made the showing required to proceed 
without an unclassified summary.  In addition to imposing too heavy of a burden 
                                                            
over these secrets in open court, jeopardizing both the future success of these programs 
and the lives of those who carry them out.”), 1995 WL 317140. 
130 See S.390, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (introduced on behalf of President Clinton) (using 
disjunctive “or”); 141 CONG. REC. S2508 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (section-by-section 
analysis) (using disjunctive “or”); S.761, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (introduced by five 
Democratic Senators) (using disjunctive “or”); 141 CONG. REC. S6206 (daily ed. May 5, 
1995) (section-by-section analysis) (using disjunctive “or”).  The Reagan Administration-
sponsored bill that originally sought to create a special alien-terrorist court likewise 
allowed for proof in the disjunctive.  See 137 CONG. REC. S1187 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) 
(“if necessary to prevent serious harm to the national security or death or serious bodily 
injury to any person, a statement informing the alien that no such summary is possible.”) 
(emphasis added), 1991 WL 6968, 88. 
131 See S.390, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (emphasis added); S.761, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) 
(emphasis added). 
132 Valentine, supra note 17, at 3. 
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on the government, see supra Part II.A, the current statutory scheme uses language 
that has no clear legal analogue to describe the risk to the national security posed 
by the release of specific evidence.   
Specifically, § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii) uses the phrase “serious and irreparable 
harm to the national security,” a novel phrase in the United States Code that does 
not appear in any court decision.133  Utilization of such an untethered standard 
creates a framework that lacks clarity for both the Department of Justice and the 
ATRC, and further impairs the viability of the court.  To remedy this situation and 
render the ATRC a viable venue, Congress should revise the statute to utilize its 
preferred classification level. 
“Since World War I, the Executive Branch has engaged in efforts to protect 
national security information by means of a classification system graded according 
to sensitivity.”134  In 1951, President Harry S. Truman extended the classification 
system from the military to civilian departments and agencies of the federal 
government, and created the familiar classification levels of “top secret,” “secret,” 
and “confidential.”135  And since at least 1978, the United States has used the same 
standards for classifying evidence at each of those levels.136  Given the durability 
and consistency of their use, the standards are now well-established in both 
executive branch operations and in case law.  This familiarity renders workable 
executive determinations on classification, and judicial review of such 
determinations. 
In direct contrast to the well-established standards for classification levels, 
the ATRC statutes utilize the phrase “serious and irreparable harm to the national 
security.”137  This combination of words has only been used in the ATRC statute.138  
                                                            
133 The only other context in which we have located this phrase is in U.S. Department of 
Justice Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee’s testimony to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence in 1975 regarding the committee’s 
release of classified information.  U.S. Intelligence Agencies & Activities: Performance of 
the Intelligence Community Hearing Before the H. Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th 
Cong. at 679 (1975), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000012936663;view=1up;seq=55 (statement of 
Asst. Att’y Gen. Rex E. Lee, Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice) (“In addition, the release of 
classified information such as the Committee has done, and has stated it will continue to 
do, causes serious and irreparable harm to the national security and foreign relations of 
the United States.”).  This statement did not require judicial application of the standard. 
134 Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (citing Developments in the Law: 
The National Security Interest & Civil Liberties – III. Information Security: 
Classification of Government Documents, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1193-94 (1972)). 
135 See Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 24, 1951); Developments in the 
Law: The National Security Interest & Civil Liberties – III. Information Security: 
Classification of Government Documents, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1972). 
136 See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (June 28, 1978); Exec. Order No. 
12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14874 (Apr. 2, 1982); Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 
(Apr. 17, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
137 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
138 The closest phrasing the authors located in a statutory or Article III context was a line 
in a brief filed on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy.  See Brief of Federal Defendants-
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Though standing alone, the “serious and irreparable harm” standard aligns with the 
equitable standard for issuing a preliminary injunction,139 its application to the more 
nebulous concept of “national security” is less clear than its application to a specific 
organization or individual.140 
Moreover, the language used to describe the harm to the national security is 
also in direct contrast to the utilization of a well-established standard with regard 
to the harm that would be caused to an individual.  The ATRC statutes allow for 
the use of classified evidence without a summary if the court determines that both 
the “continued presence of the alien in the United States” and “the provision of [an 
adequate] summary would likely cause  . . . death or serious bodily injury to any 
person.”141  The “death or serious bodily injury” standard is relatively simple to 
apply.  “Death,” of course, is self-explanatory.  And “serious bodily injury” is a 
term that is defined elsewhere in federal statutes,142 and in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.143  It is a familiar, discernible standard that can be applied to determine 
whether the government has adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the ATRC 
standards with regard to the risk posed to an individual. 
Legislative revision would bring similar predictability and uniformity to 
ATRC’s standard for the type of harm posed to the national security.  In light of the 
well-established classification level standards and the nature of the court, Congress 
would be well served to utilize the language that has become so ingrained in the 
national security framework.  The application of these standards would permit the 
                                                            
Appellants at 18, Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 
2007) (No. 07-56157), 2007 WL 3069208 (“The district court then dismissed in a single 
sentence the evidence showing that a preliminary injunction would cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the Navy and national security.”). 
139 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking 
a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he 
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). 
140 “National security” is statutorily defined within the ATRC statutes to broadly mean 
“the national defense and foreign relations of the United States,” a definition incorporated 
from the Classified Information Protection Act.  8 U.S.C. § 1531 (incorporating 18 
U.S.C. App. 3 § 1).  Cf. AMOS A. JORDAN ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 4 
(6th ed. 2009) (noting the multiple principles covered by the term “national security” and 
stating that  “[p]reserving the national security of the United States requires safeguarding 
individual freedoms and other U.S. values, as well as the laws and institutions established 
to protect them”). 
141 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
142 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (“(3) the term ‘serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury 
which involves--(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) protracted 
and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a 
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty”); 21 U.S.C. § 802 (“(25) The term “serious 
bodily injury” means bodily injury which involves--(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) 
protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (C) protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”).  Notably, the definition of 18 
U.S.C. § 1365 is expressly incorporated elsewhere into at least one other section of Title 
8.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii). 
143 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M). 
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Department of Justice sufficient predictability in assessing whether the classified 
information in support of removing the potential defendant is of the type intended 
by Congress to justify proceeding without an unclassified summary.144   
As noted above, the ATRC statutes use the phrase “serious and irreparable 
harm to the national security.”145  That standard appears to exist somewhere 
between the standards for classifying evidence as “Secret” (“serious damage”) and 
“Top Secret” (“exceptionally grave damage”).146  In light of Congress’ original 
drafting choice, we suggest that the classification standard for Secret be used.  This 
would facilitate the United States’ non-disclosure of information that would pose 
serious damage to the national security to the public and to a defendant for whom 
the Attorney General and an Article III judge on the ATRC have already found 
probable cause to believe is an alien terrorist.147  This is a functional solution, 
particularly in light of the fact that the alien defendant may be entitled to 
government-financed, cleared counsel who will be able to review the classified 
evidence against the defendant,148 and automatic expedited appeal under a de novo 
standard of review.149 
 
C. Other revisions to better-enumerate Congress’s intent. 
 
While making the foregoing critical changes to the ATRC statutes, 
Congress should also utilize the opportunity to clarify its original intent with certain 
clarifications. 
 
i. Clarifying that classified evidence is appropriate for consideration 
on the merits. 
 
The ATRC statutes should be modified to make clear that classified 
evidence submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte review is properly part 
of the basis for the court’s removal decision.150  The ability to introduce classified 
evidence in support of removal is the ATRC’s raison d’être.151  As currently 
                                                            
144 The United States always retains the ability to declassify evidence, where appropriate, 
if it decides that removal is important and the evidence does not rise to the level for 
proceeding without an unclassified summary.  8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A). 
145 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
146 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
147 8 U.S.C. § 1533.  
148 Id. § 1534(c)(1), (e)(3)(F). 
149 Id. § 1535(c)(2), (4)(D). 
150 Id. § 1534(c)(5).   
151 See Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism, Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration of the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 47 (2001), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=2388 (statement of Jeanne A. Butterfield, American 
Immigration Lawyers Association on Oct. 17, 2001) (“[T]he new Alien Terrorist 
Removal Procedures. . . were designed to allow the government to conduct deportation 
hearings with the use of secret evidence.”); ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 97 (“the 
Alien Terrorist Removal Court [was] expressly designed to remove alien terrorists by 
using classified evidence to support a terrorist allegation and by staffed by counsel 
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drafted, however, the court’s reliance upon such information seems intended but is 
unclear; providing only that “[t]he decision of the judge regarding removal shall be 
based only on the evidence introduced at the removal hearing.152  Notably that 
“removal hearing” is “open to public.”153  But Congress provided elsewhere that 
the ATRC’s written “decision as to whether the alien shall be removed” should be 
only be made publicly available after appropriate redactions have been made.154  
Thus, Congress contemplated that the court would receive classified evidence in 
support of removal in camera and ex parte, and be able to rely on such information 
in making its removal determination.155  Accordingly, we propose the inclusion of 
similar language to clarify that consideration of such information is proper.  
Specifically, Congress should include the phrase “and all classified evidence 
submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte review” at the end of the 
subparagraph delineating the evidence that can be relied upon in making the 
removal decision.156 
 
ii. Clarifying that the ATRC should be evaluating the risk posted by 
disclosure of an “adequate summary,” which would include 
disclosure of classified information. 
 
The reference to “summary” in the subsection establishing the standard for 
when the government can proceed without the provision of an unclassified 
summary should be clarified.157  It refers to “the summary,” which is unclear 
because the subsection applies only in the context where the government has 
                                                            
possessing the security clearances necessary to review classified evidence”); Alien 
Terrorist Removal Court, 45 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 55 (Sept. 1997), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2007/01/11/usab4505.pdf (“[The] 
ATRC is designed to allow the United States to deport alien terrorists on the basis of 
classified information without having to disclose that information to the alien or the 
public.”); Martin, supra note 111, at 316 (“Only since 1996 has the government been 
authorized to use confidential information as part of the case in chief supporting 
removability of an admitted alien, and only in the context of unique proceedings before a 
special tribunal known as the Alien Terrorist Removal Court”).  
152 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(5).  This is in contrast to the provision allowing the ATRC to base 
its initial probable cause determination on such evidence.  Id. § 1533(a)(1) (“In 
determining whether to grant an application under this section, a single judge of the 
removal court may consider, ex parte and in camera, in addition to the information 
contained in the application—(A) other information, including classified information 
. . .”). 
153 Id. § 1534(a)(2).   
154 Id. § 1534(j) (“Any portion of the order that would reveal the substance or source of 
information received in camera and ex parte pursuant to subsection (e) shall not be made 
available to the alien or the public.”). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. § 1534(c)(5).   
157 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) (“The findings described in this clause are, with respect to 
an alien, that— . . .(II) the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any 
person.”). 
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proposed an unclassified summary (i.e. one which would not pose such a risk)158 
which the ATRC has determined to be inadequate.159  The language should be 
revised to say “an adequate summary” to capture Congress’s intent that the ATRC 
evaluate the risk posed to the national security by producing a summary that would 
be adequate (i.e., one that would likely contain classified information). 
 
iii. Correcting clerical errors in statutory language and cross 
references. 
 
Any legislation to address the issues discussed in this article should also 
include provisions to correct several errors of a clerical nature.  Specifically, the 
cross-reference in § 1535(c)(4)(D) providing for de novo review of factual findings 
where a defendant was not provided with a summary of the classified evidence 
should be corrected so that it refers to the section of § 1534 that actually addresses 
that possibility.160  Likewise, § 1534 should be revised to use the singular 
“proceeding” rather than the plural form, and to maintain uniformity in how it refers 
to forms of ancillary relief that are unavailable in ATRC proceedings.161 
 
D. This legislative proposal for changes to the ATRC is likely 
constitutional. 
 
The only actual determinant of constitutionality of the ATRC would be 
judicial review—which would likely culminate with Supreme Court review—of an 
as-applied challenge to ATRC proceedings.  Much of the literature that examines 
the ATRC concludes that the court may be susceptible to Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause vulnerability.162  Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to guarantee whether 
                                                            
158 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(B) (“With respect to such information, the Government shall submit 
to the removal court an unclassified summary of the specific evidence that does not pose 
that risk.”). 
159 See generally id. § 1534(e)(3)(D). 
160 See 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(4)(D).  Compare id. § 1534(c)(3) (addressing a defendant’s 
“[r]ights in hearing”) with id. § 1534(e)(3) (addressing “[t]reatment of classified 
information” and situations in which case can proceed without summary). 
161 See id. § 1534(e)(1)(A) (using plural “proceedings” where sentence structure calls for 
singular “proceeding”), (k) (including adverb “by” in context where it makes no logical 
sense and is inconsistent with other disjunctive subsections).   
162 See, e.g., DYCUS ET AL., supra note 106, at 856 (“It may be that constitutional doubts 
about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this special court are why the 
government has never used it.”); Blum, supra note 18, at 703 (“Many scholars have 
argued that the ATRC deprives aliens of procedural due process under the Fifth 
Amendment; hence, its non-use may reflect a fear that if it was used to remove aliens 
based on classified evidence, it may be struck down as unconstitutional.”); id. at 704-10 
(reviewing arguments made against constitutionality of ATRC); Niles, supra note 35, at 
1837 (“Perhaps out of fear about the ATRC’s constitutionality, the attorney general has 
never used the court.”).  Cf. Zachery, supra note 22, at 294 (“The [ATRC] is an 
amalgamation of statutes which are independently constitutional . . . select[ing] 
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a novel specialty court that literally considers “secret” (or “top secret”) evidence ex 
parte is constitutional.163  However, there are strong arguments in favor of the 
ATRC’s ability to withstand Fifth Amendment due process scrutiny that are not 
adversely affected by our proposal, especially as it applies to LPRs, the principal 
class of noncitizen terrorists for which we think the ATRC is still required 
following the passage of IIRIRA and the PATRIOT Act.164  As described below, 
the ATRC statutes provide LPRs with important procedural protections that are 
superior to protections in conventional administrative removal proceedings.  
Accounting for the possibility of a court identifying heightened due process rights 
for an LPR in ATRC proceedings,165 a due process analysis that contemplates an 
LPR defendant where an unclassified summary is not provided is not only the most 
likely scenario for the court’s use, but also the scenario that triggers the most 
procedural protections available to the defendant. 
Congress carefully considered the constitutionality and the due process 
implications of the ATRC statutes at the time of AEDPA’s enactment.166  Congress 
intentionally engaged in due process balancing, designing what it believed would 
be “an effective means of removing terrorist noncitizens from our shores, while 
protecting due process concerns.”167  Moreover, the statutorily compliant utilization 
of the ATRC by senior Justice Department leadership would squarely implicate 
plenary powers doctrinal considerations that could weigh in the Executive Branch’s 
favor on judicial review.168 
                                                            
constitutionally valid provision from each statute.  The result is legislation that is within 
the letter of the law but is arguably not within the spirit of our democracy[.]”). 
163 We do not examine the constitutionality of the detention provisions in the ATRC 
statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1534(i) & 1536(a)(2)(A), due to the high variability of their 
potential use and the fact that there is ample detention authority contained elsewhere in 
the INA under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231. 
164 See supra § III.  
165 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001) (contemplating possible variable 
due process protection for “an alien subject to a final order of deportation” depending on 
“status and circumstance”). 
166 142 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 
141 CONG. REC. S6202, S6206 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (section-by-section analysis) 
(“[The ATRC provisions are] a carefully measured response to the menace posed by alien 
terrorists and fully comports with and exceeds all constitutional requirements applicable 
to aliens.”); 141 CONG. REC. S7484, S7487 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (remarks of Sen. 
Biden) (criticizing the ATRC proposals as creating a “kind of Star Chamber proceeding” 
predicated on the use of classified evidence); Yu, supra note 21, at 1 (“Congress 
structured the ATRC to balance national security needs with fundamental notions of due 
process.”). 
167 142 CONG. REC. S3352, S3354 (daily ed. April 16, 1996). 
168 See U.S. ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“[w]hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1889) (deferring to 
Congress or the agencies on the question of national security and immigration); but see 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (acknowledging that such deference is subject to the 
Constitution in a case that involved a claim of unconstitutional prolonged immigration 
detention—the judiciary “must defer to the Executive and Legislative Branch” on 
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Due process protections are a central feature to the counter-majoritarian 
protections contained in the Bill of Rights, and the adjudication of a due process 
claim is an individualized determination.169  The Supreme Court has traditionally 
relied on the three-part balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge to adjudicate Fifth 
Amendment procedural due process claims.170  In a prospective as-applied 
challenge to the revised ATRC—one that is based on legislative revision that aligns 
with the recommendations of this article—a court would first need to consider the 
varying private interest particulars of the case including any limitations on access 
to classified evidentiary materials, the nature of the unclassified summary to the 
extent one is provided, the fullness of notice related to the allegations of fact, the 
judgment of the ATRC on questions of both fact and law, and potentially other 
considerations.  
The court then would likely weigh the foregoing against the government’s 
national security and INA enforcement interests against alleged noncitizen 
terrorists, along with the panoply of pro-defendant and pro-transparency 
procedures, especially in comparison with administrative removal proceedings, to 
determine “the risk of erroneous deprivation” of the defendant’s protected 
interest(s) and the “probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards.”171  In some respects, the pro-defendant procedures of the ATRC 
exceed those that were afforded by the Supreme Court in its maximalist opinion 
regarding a welfare recipient in Goldberg v. Kelly172 and in comparison to 
procedures that exist in conventional administrative removal proceedings.    
In particular and unlike administrative removal proceedings, there is direct 
political accountability for the initiation of ATRC cases, vested in the Attorney 
                                                            
immigration questions, but the congressional “plenary power” on setting immigration 
policy is “subject to constitutional limitations.”).  See also Michael Kagan, Plenary 
Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 
23 (2015) (describing one scholar’s observation that the Supreme Court has deferred to 
Congress on procedural due process questions less over time). 
169 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
170 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 528-29 (2004) (observing that the Mathews test applies to property and liberty 
interests): 
Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is 
determined by weighing “the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action” against the Government’s asserted interest, “including the 
function involved” and the burdens the Government would face in 
providing greater process [. . .].  The Mathews calculus then 
contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an 
analysis of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest if 
the process were reduced and the “probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards.” 
171 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
172 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970).  Notably, limitation of access to 
classified information can implicate the particularized notice, cross-examination 
capability, and breadth of the written decision following the adjudication procedures that 
the welfare recipient in Goldberg was entitled. 
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General or the Deputy Attorney General.173  There is also Article III accountability 
for such case initiation with a weighty probable cause standard.174  Unlike 
administrative removal proceedings that reserve Article III review until the 
completion of a two-stage administrative adjudicatory process, there is Article III 
administration of all stages of an ATRC case from initiation through final judgment 
and appeal.175  Unlike administrative removal proceedings, there is a statutory 
requirement for speedy proceedings in ATRC cases176 and the ATRC statutes 
enumerate a right to government-financed counsel.177 
Moreover, LPRs who were not provided a written summary of classified 
information earlier in proceedings are entitled to government funded, cleared 
“special” counsel to access and challenge the veracity of classified information,178 
as well as appellate de novo review of ATRC factual findings.179  Such defendants 
are also entitled to a “release hearing” before an ATRC judge upon the Justice 
Department’s filing of a case-initiating application to the court.180  On appeal, there 
are number of unique defendant-centric advantages in ATRC proceedings that 
weigh favorably for the government in a Mathews inquiry.181  There is an automatic 
stay of a removal order during the pendency of appeal.182  There is automatic appeal 
of certain decisions,183 and there is a requirement for expedited appeal.184   
Given the numerous procedures that Congress mandated to make the ATRC 
less Star Chamber-like, a visual reference is helpful to convey the superior 
procedural protections that LPR noncitizens are afforded in an ATRC proceeding. 
 
Comparison of Relative Procedures for ATRC and EOIR Proceeding for LPRs 
                                                            
173 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (administrative removal proceedings are initiated by the 
lodging of a “Notice to Appear,” which flows from delegable authority) with id. 
§ 1533(a)(1) (requiring non-delegable authorization). 
174 Id. § 1533(c)(2).  The government may supplement its application with “information, 
including classified information, presented under oath or affirmation” and testimony at a 
hearing on the application.  Id. § 1533(c)(1) 
175 Compare id. § 1252(a)(5), (b) (describing a petition for review process for 
administratively final orders of removal) with id. §§ 1531-1537 (contemplating the 
Article III function at all stages of adjudication).  The government may supplement its 
application with “information, including classified information, presented under oath or 
affirmation” and testimony at a hearing on the application.  Id. § 1533(c)(1) 
176 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1) (“a removal hearing shall be conducted under this section as 
expeditiously as practicable”).  Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove 
Bigger Barrier for Migrants Than Any Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/24/us/migrants-border-immigration-
court.html (examining the consequences of an immigration court backlog in excess of 
800,000 cases).   
177 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1). 
178 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E), (F). 
179 Id. § 1535(c)(4)(D). 
180 Id. § 1536(a)(2)(A). 
181 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
182 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1). 
183 Id. § 1535(c)(2)(A). 
184 Id. § 1535(c)(4). 
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Procedure ATRC proceedings EOIR proceedings Process advantage 
Article II political 
accountability to 
initiate and prosecute 
removal? 
Yes; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(a)(1) 
No ATRC defendant 
Article III probable 
cause threshold 
determination required 
to initiate proceeding? 
Yes; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(c)(2) 
No ATRC defendant 
Classified evidence 
availability without 
disclosure to LPR, incl. 
FISA and foreign 
intelligence evidence? 
Yes; e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1534(c)(2), 
(d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(3) 
No, limited 
classified info. in 
limited situations;     
8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(b)(4)(B)  
EOIR respondent 
Right to (potentially 
cleared) counsel at 
government expense? 
Yes; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1534(c)(1), 
(e)(3)(F) 
No ATRC defendant 
Article III removal 
hearing and 
adjudication? 
Yes; e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1534(i)  
No ATRC defendant 
Applicability of Fed. 
Rules of Evidence? 
No; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1534(h) 
No; see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(3) 
N/A 
Availability of 
nationwide subpoena 
power to summon 
witnesses, incl. gov’t 
funded attendance and 
fees? 
Yes; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1534(d)(1)-(4) 
No ATRC defendant 
Expedited hearing? Yes; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1534(a)(1) 
No ATRC defendant 
(for detention 
purposes) 
Immediate and 
potentially automatic 
expedited Art. III 
appeal availability?  
Yes; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1535(c) 
No; administrative 
exhaustion is 
required, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(d) 
ATRC defendant 
 
Accordingly, there are ample procedures that could lead Article III jurists 
to conclude that the ATRC passes due process muster under a Mathews analysis, 
but the ultimate test will come in an as-applied challenge if and when the court is 
used, and then predicated principally on how persuasively primary and cleared 
counsel argue that the withholding of certain classified evidence creates an 
unacceptably high probability of judicial error. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
  
 Though the ATRC currently presents as a zombie court, it was created for 
the discrete and important purpose of reconciling the congressional imperatives of 
protecting national security information and removing noncitizen terrorists while 
maintaining fidelity to the Constitution and providing due process.  It took three 
successive presidential administrations to enact its statutory framework and it has 
existed for nearly a quarter century without hearing a single case.  The IIRIRA and 
PARTIOT Act have since provided alternative mechanisms to hold accountable and 
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remove non-LPRs noncitizens.  Even so, the importance of the ATRC remains 
static for the few terrorist LPRs who cannot otherwise be removed from the United 
States.  To the extent Congress enacts the commonsense and narrow reforms to the 
statutes that we propose in this article, it is likely the ATRC will finally be rendered 
functional and therefore able to fulfill its important function to provide an avenue 
for the removal of the most serious LPR threats to national security.  Indeed, 
because of the ATRC’s procedural impediments, such individuals may very well 
currently be present in the United States for want of prosecutorial tools to remove 
them without compromising critical national security sources and information. 
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APPENDIX A:  PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE 
 
A BILL 
To amend the provision in Title 8, United States Code, related to the Alien 
Terrorist Removal Court (8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537) to clarify the standards for 
utilization of the ATRC. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. UPDATING THE ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT 
1) Title 8, United States Code, Subchapter V (8 U.S.C. 1531-1537), is 
amended: 
a) by striking the period after “hearing” in section 1534(c)(5) and 
inserting the following language at the end: “and all classified 
evidence submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte review.”; 
b) by striking “proceedings” in section 1534(e)(1)(A) and replacing with 
“proceeding”; 
c) by striking “person, and” in section 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) and replacing 
with “person, or”; 
d) by striking “serious and irreparable harm” in section 
1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) and replacing with “serious damage”; 
e) by striking “serious and irreparable harm” in section 
1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) and replacing with “serious damage”; 
f) by striking “the summary” in section 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) and 
replacing with “an adequate summary”; and 
g) by striking the cross-reference to “1534(c)(3)” in section 
1535(c)(4)(D) and replacing with “1534(e)(3)”. 
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